Matching students and colleges using Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA) is a popular method in centralized college admissions mechanisms. However, different than the advocated setting that allows students to rank all colleges, DA is mostly applied with truncated rank order lists (ROL). Truncated ROLs incentivize students to prepare their lists by taking their assignment probabilities into account and estimating students' college preferences in these environments requires special methods. This paper proposes a practical and data-driven approach for estimating students' college preferences based on students' college ranking strategies in large college admissions model and available public information. Characterizing students' optimal college ranking strategies according to expected matching outcomes and allowing students to generate subjective assignment probabilities using past years' information, we offer an estimation strategy with the sets of colleges that is expected to considered and found accessible by students.
Introduction
In many countries college admissions are controlled by central mechanisms. In these mechanisms students and colleges are matched according to students' reported list of colleges and colleges' student sorting rules (e.g. exam scores). Mechanism design literature (For extensive literature reviews, Sönmez andÜnver (2011), Abdulkadiroglu (2013) ) has been examined properties of various mechanisms and strongly advocates truthful revelation of preferences (strategy-proof) in the admissions mechanisms (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) ). Even though there are mechanisms that satisfy truthful revelation of preferences as the best choice, most of the real world applications do not. Therefore, students' reported college rankings from these mechanisms do not represent students' true college preference orders and estimating students' college preferences with data from these mechanisms requires special methods.
Deferred Acceptance is one of the most advocated mechanisms in the theoretical literature because reporting ROLs according to students' true preference orders is best strategy for them (strategy-proof).
1 However, DA is mostly applied with truncated ROLs in many admissions mechanisms, e.g., Amsterdam, Boston, Greece, Hungary, Paris, Taiwan, and Turkey. Under truncation, DA does not preserve its strategy-proofness property (Haeringer and Klijn (2009) , Calsamiglia et al. (2010) ). Moreover, strategic considerations are getting serious by the length of ROLs over total choice ratio approaches to zero. Therefore, estimating students' college preferences from reported ROLs by assuming truth-telling is not supported by theory and data.
2
In this paper, we offer a novel, practical, and data-driven preference estimation method from students' reported rank order lists in a centralized college admissions that is using DA with truncated lists and students are sorted according to predetermined admission rules.
Since there is a high possibility of observing strategically reported ROLs as a result of taking assignment probabilities into account, we start to analyze students' optimal ROL strategies in large matching models to develop an estimation strategy accordingly. Large matching models are both better representation of national level college admissions and allow us to characterize students' optimal college ranking strategies according to expected matching outcomes. Using predictions of this model and available public information of past years' matching outcomes 1 Even though truthful ranking is weakly dominant under DA in general, under some regulatory conditions reporting true preference order is strictly dominant. Fack et al. (2017) show the dominance of true preference order under strict swap monotonicity assumption.
2 In our data we observe that students omit popular colleges if they expect a low chance of being accepted. Omission of popular schools is a clear example for truth-telling is not a good assumption to rely on for identifying preferences. 1 to generate assignment probabilities, we offer an estimation strategy based on students' ranking behavior among the set of colleges that is considered to be accessible from students.
Consequently, colleges in these sets can not be part of strategically eliminated preferred colleges in ROLs and estimating preferences using these sets do not suffer from making mistaken comparisons, which is the major concern behind the estimation methods based on truth-telling assumption. In addition, this framework enables us to estimate students' college preferences from constructed personal choice sets and their reported rank-order lists using ordered response data methods. Therefore, we both eliminate issues related strategic behavior in ROL preparation strategies and incorporate lists of choices in our estimation framework.
There are also recent papers (Among many others, Fack et al. (2017) , Akyol and Krishna (2017) ) develop estimation methods based on equilibrium conditions of matching models to overcome issues resulting from truth-telling assumption. Stability is the standard equilibrium notion in the two-sided matching games and it is used to characterize students' behavior.
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In DA with truncated lists, stability (asymptotic stability) of the matching outcome depends on whether students play equilibrium strategies or not. If students do not play equilibrium strategies, the matching is less likely to be stable. Therefore, estimating students' college preferences based on stability assumption is rather restrictive because these approaches do not capture individual mistakes and heterogeneities among students (e.g. risk attitudes).
In addition, resulting estimation methods based on (asymptotic) stability can not include all listed colleges in the reported ROLs to the preference estimation, which is a loss of valuable information. Finally, it is observed that students report ROL which are full of unfeasible colleges. Estimation of preferences based on stability assumption has to exclude these students, which causes another under utilization of available information.
Our estimation method also offers solutions to the problems originated from equilibriumplay assumptions using large matching market outcome approximations. Outcomes from large matching markets include valuable information for the forthcoming matching outcomes if agents use this information to optimize their strategies.
4 Specifically for national level admissions, it is observed that past years' matching outcomes are stable across years and used as a benchmark for the forthcoming matchings. 5 In this setting students' college preferences and exam scores are private information, however, past years' outcomes are mostly publicly available and provide information for the forthcoming matching outcomes. Under these conditions, it is expected that candidates prepare their ROLs using available information.
Therefore, developing estimation methods that incorporates available public information is both relaxation of strong equilibrium-play assumptions and better representation of students'
behavior in large college admissions.
Implementation of our students' college preference estimation method starts by constructing choice sets (consideration sets) for each student. Our objective of constructing consideration sets is creating choice environments such that using colleges within these sets for estimation do not suffer from mistaken comparisons. In DA with truncated lists, students may not include their preferred choices if they believe assignment probabilities are too low even though these choices are more preferred.
6 Therefore, treating all colleges that are not in the ROL as if they are not preferred leads wrong comparisons. Comparing wrong colleges is detrimental for reliable estimates and this is the major concern for estimating students' college preferences by adopting truth-telling assumption. Since making mistaken comparison of colleges is the major concern in students' college preference estimation, our estimation method is designed for eliminating these cases. In our method, we achieve this by constructing personal consideration sets according to students' subjective assignment probabilities of colleges, which incorporates individual heterogeneities (e.g. risk attitudes, understanding of mechanism, . . .), and uses past years' matching outcome information. All colleges are in consideration sets could be selected and ranked in students' ROLs and students choose according to their preferences among all colleges within these sets. As a result, obtained estimation results using reported ROLs and constructed ROLs do not suffer from mistaken comparisons.
Our method is applied to centralized college admissions data from Turkey. In Turkey, the national admissions center assigns students to colleges based on students' reported ROLs, college entrance exam scores, and high school GPAs using student-proposing DA. The number of available college-majors slots are more than 7500. 7 Students are only allowed to rank up 5 Data from Turkish college admissions shows that the stability of cutoff scores over the years. Table 7 presents the correlation of cutoff scores across years and figure 2 shows the distribution of demeaned cutoff scores. Ajayi (2015) also documents that the stability of matching outcomes.
6 Manipulating the order of college in ROL is not beneficial in DA setting in comparison to Boston mechanism. We rule out these strategies from students' behavior.
7 Major and college choice are simultaneous.
3 to 24 colleges. Our data set consists of 12829 students, however, we restricted analysis with student who have reported their rank order lists after learning their scores. 8 This data set is a combination of a questionnaire that includes student socioeconomic background information of the representative sample of senior high school students and their admission priorties. We also collect cutoff scores of colleges from the national admissions center website in order to benefit from public information.
To compare our consideration set based estimation method with the other methods are proposed in the literature, we use Hausman-type specification tests. As in the Fack et al.
(2017), truth-telling vs stability comparison test, we implement a test for stability assumption vs consideration set approach. Our test rejects truth-telling and stability in a favor of consideration set approach. According to our preferred estimation results, colleges in the same cities and colleges that provide scholarship are preferred are more preferred. Colleges programs that are offered in evening hours are also less preferred. Moreover, these preferences are changing with gender, income levels, and parents' education levels.
Finally, preference estimates provide an opportunity to perform counterfactual analysis.
There are many admissions criteria for college and public school admissions. Since these criteria are one of the main policy instruments for the admissions mechanisms, it is crucial to see welfare effects. By estimated true preference orders, we evaluate only college exam scorebased and only high school GPA-based admission criteria's effect on students' welfare. We find that the magnitude of welfare changes by income categories, high school types, gender and groups. These results suggest that a policymaker should take differentiated effects of admission criteria on students from different socioeconomic groups, high school types, ages and gender.
The structure of this paper as follows: We conclude introduction section with a discussion of the related literature. In section two, we describe centralized college admissions mechanism. In the third section, we present our identification strategy with consideration sets. Section four presents college admissions mechanism of Turkey and summaries the data.
Next, we describe our econometric specification and estimation results. In section six, the counterfactual analyses of different admission criteria. Then, we conclude.
From the influential paper by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) , the design of school choice mechanisms has been an important research path, and many public school choice mechanisms in cities including Boston and New York are changed after these studies. Even though in some particular cases depending on truthful revelation assumption is supported from data and mechanism (Drewes and Michael (2006) , Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017) ), it is not applicable in most of the application. Among others, Fack et al. (2017) , Akyol and Krishna (2017) offer preference estimation method without assuming truth-telling in DA setting. They use asymptotic stability of the matching to estimate preferences, which is a weaker assumption than truth-telling.
Our paper not only develops estimation methods based large matching models such that it includes full list of choices and all students in the estimation but also relaxes dependences of equilibrium play assumption by allowing individual heterogeneities. Even though Fack et al. (2017) deals with truth-telling assumption vigorously by estimating preferences based on asymptotic stability of the outcome, they only use matched choice and feasible set of colleges to estimate students' preferences. Kirkebøen et al. (2012) and Burgess et al. (2015) also use the same discrete choice framework to understand the effects of educational choices.
These approaches do not utilize all available information of reported ROLs in the estimation.
However, we are incorporating all listed colleges in ROLs by extending estimating framework based on students' behavior in large college admissions model and using publicly available past years' matching outcome information.
Among other papers that are proposing estimation of students' preferences from truncated ROLs, Ajayi (2015) is the closest one to our paper. She also creates set of schools to estimate preferences according to public information and selectivity criteria. Different than our estimation framework, she uses stronger choice assumptions and set restrictions in the estimation. 9 Our consideration set-based estimation, however, are supported by large college admissions model's prediction and using ordered response data methods, which are of better representation of students' ranking behavior in national level admissions.
Apart from preference estimation in DA mechanism, there is also growing literature on students' preference estimation under different admissions mechanisms. Among others, He (2012), Calsamiglia et al. (2014) , Hwang (2015) , and Agarwal and Somaini (2016) study 9 The set restrictions are not supported in our data and ranking of schools according to assignment probabilities is not supported by data also it does not represent underlying valuation of schools.
erences, estimating students' preferences also requires understanding of students' ranking behavior. In these papers, observed ROLs are considered as maximizing expected utility as in our model. By using estimated assignment probabilities as student's beliefs, discrete choice methods can be applied on the set of possible ROLs.
Researches with data from decentralized college admissions are another related literature. Avery et al. (2012) propose a ranking of U.S. undergraduate programs based on students' revealed preferences. Long (2004) examines how students choose colleges in U.S. and answer decisions determinants changes over time. They develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey's college admissions. Caner and Okten (2010) investigate risk taking behavior in submission of ROLs according to socioeconomic status by looking at students' major preferences at college entry. Caner and Okten (2013) examine how the benefits of publicly financed higher education in Turkey are distributed among students with different socioeconomic status.
Saygin (2013) find that gender has significant effects on college choice in Turkey such that female students prefer lower ranked colleges. However, none of these papers investigates the estimation methodology under DA with truncated ROLs.
Model
College admissions is a classical example of matching markets and matching theory provides a structure to analyze students' behavior. In this section, we start by summarizing the centralized college admissions setup, students' ranking behavior when the number of students are finite, and show convergence to the limit game. The limit game is defined with the continuum of students and with the same proportions of college capacities as in the finite game. Students' college ranking strategies are analyzed using the result from the limit game approximations. In the formation of the expectation for the forthcoming matchings, we assume that students use past years' outcomes as source of information. 
Centralized college admissions
We consider a student-college matching with a set of students (S) is indexed by i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and set of colleges (C) is indexed by j ∈ {0, . . . , J}. College 0 denotes being unmatched.
Each college j has q j > 0 seats and these are announced before the students' exam scores 10 are known. C 0 has unlimited seats. We assume that student i derives u i,j utility from assignment into college j. Utility of being matched with each college is assumed to have support [u j ,ū j ] ∈ [0, 1] for all j ∈ C. Colleges rank students according to entrance exam scores which transformed into priorities p i,j . A college j prefers student i over student k if and only if p i,j > p k,j .
After announcement of entrance exam scores, each student has an option to submit a
. K denotes the length of the ROL and it is smaller than the number of colleges in the mechanism (K < J). l k i is student i's k th choice and it is
We assume that there is a positive cost of including a college in the ROL and denoted with κ > 0.
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The centralized student-college matching is solved by a mechanism that takes students'
ROLs and entrance exam scores that determine student priorities. In this paper, we focus on a student-proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm that is aligned with our data. The algorithm works as follows:
• Round 1 : Every candidate applies to her first choice. Each college rejects the lowestranked students in excess of its capacity and temporarily holds the other students.
• Round N : Every student who is rejected in Round N-1 applies to the next choice on her list. Each college, pooling together new students and those who were held from Round N-1, rejects the lowest-ranked students in excess of its capacity.
The process terminates after any Round N when no rejections are issued. Then each college is matched with the students that it is currently holding. A matching is defined as in Balinski and Sönmez (1999) such that it is an allocation of colleges to students such that no student occupies more than one position. Formally;
If µ(i) = C 0 , student i is not assigned any college.
If a student is rejected in all rounds of the algorithm, she is assigned to C 0 in the model. which means she is not assigned to any college.
Students' college ranking strategies in the finite economy
In student-college matching, students have assignment probabilities to be admitted from each college. These probabilities depend on their priorities and reported ROLs as well as their rivals' priorities and ROLs. If one expresses students' assignment probabilities according to priorities and ROLs, students' behavior can be analyzed according to expected utilities. Following Fack et al. (2017), Agarwal and Somaini (2016) , assignment probabilities are expressed by;
is either one for some college in C or zero if there is no ties in priorities.
12 Since priorities and preferences are private information, students form their strategies according to joint preference and priority distribution G(u|p) × H(p).
In the symmetric equilibrium, σ * solves the following problem for every student:
Existence of pure and mixed strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium are established by Milgrom and Weber (1985) , while uniqueness is not generally true.
13
12 We assume strict priority orders based on exam scores. In priority rules with ties, characterizing assignment probabilities requires special format, which is not considered in this paper.
13 Multiple equilibria and multiplicity of stable outcomes also increase the chance of students play non equilibrium strategies or play different equilibria strategies. Consequently, the chance of stable outcome decreases.
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Given an equilibrium σ * from the realization of preferences and priorities, a matching µ σ * is observed such that the outcome of matching is summarized with the ex-post cutoff of each college:
where t j (µ σ * ) denotes the cutoff of college j. Equation 2 shows that if there is no remaining slot after the matching, cutoff is the minimum priority level of the matched students. Zero cutoff means that particular college does not receive sufficient application to meet its capacity.
Assignment probabilities are redefined with cutoffs such that;
Then, we define stability of matching which is the standard equilibrium notion in the non-transferable utility matching markets. Stability is a commonly used concept in twosided matching, is defined in our setting as follows:
Definition 2. Given a matching µ, (i, j) blocks the matching if student i prefers college j to her match and either (1) college j does not fill its quota or (2) college j is matched to another student who has strictly lower priority than student's i. A matching µ is stable if there is no student-college blocking pair.
Stability can also be defined with college cutoffs. Given a matching µ, a college j is
where T (µ) represents vector of cutoffs 14 in matching µ. Then,
This lemma is a basic feature of the college admissions model with finite number of students investigated in many papers (among others, Balinski and Sönmez (1999) and Sönmez andÜnver (2011)). Azevedo and Leshno (2016) depart from a finite number of students on one side of the matching and analyze the college admissions game with a continuum of 14 Since there is one to one relation between scores and priorities in a no ties environment, we are using these concept interchangeably. We continue to use score after we define large matching market structure. 9 students. We adopt the continuum number of students approach to analyze the college admissions model, which is more suitable representation of national level college admissions.
Convergence of discrete economies to continuum economies
This section presents the convergence of economies with finite number of students to economies with infinite number of students. With this result, we can analyze students' college ranking behavior as individual optimization problems.
Following Azevedo and Leshno (2016) and Fack et al. (2017) , we consider sequences of finite size economies denoted by {F S } S∈N such that
1. There are S students in F S , whose types are i.i.d. draws from G × H.
2. Each college's capacity relative to S remains constant, i.e. q S j /S =q j for all j, wherē q j is a positive constant.
The continuum economy, E, is defined as follows:
1. A mass of students, S, have type space [0, 1] J ×[0, 1] associated with probability measure of G × H.
2. College j has a positive capacityq j for all j ∈ C.
Azevedo and Leshno (2016) show that discrete economies converge to a continuum economy when there is a unique stable matching. Fack et al. (2017) modify this finding according to the DA setting and show that for cases students have ordinal preferences.The convergence results can be seen from the following proposition. (2016), Fack et al. (2017) 
Proposition 1. (Azevedo and Leshno
where σ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of F S , and apply it to the sequence of finite economies
Then, we have:
1. The cutoffs of finite matching game converges to cutoffs of the continuum game, 2. The fraction of blocking pairs in the finite economy converges to zero, 3. The asymptotic distribution of cutoffs are normally distributed.
vergence of finite economies to continuum economies result provides a good approximation to large college admissions. Under this framework, whenever the continuum economy has a unique stable matching, all stable matchings of the discrete economies converge to a unique stable matching of the continuum economy. Hence, all stable matchings of the large economies becomes similar.
The large matching market with continuum of students allows us to characterize students' college ranking behavior in college admissions game in a simple setting. Under the continuum economy, students' behavior can be reinterpreted with the expected outcomes of the matching. For example, with a known distribution of cutoff scores, students do not have to consider rivals' strategies in a college admissions process. Instead, they optimize their college ranking strategies according to the distribution of college cutoff scores in addition to personal valuations over colleges. Therefore, we make the following assumption to utilize this result in analyzing students' behavior in a large college admissions.
Assumption 1. Students are assumed to generate a distribution of cutoff scores for the forthcoming matching realizations using available information from past years' matching outcomes.
Assuming that students generate a distribution of cutoff scores for colleges is a weaker assumption than assuming perfect information about preferences and distribution of preferences. Since cutoff scores are observables and there are public records from past matchings, students can approximate the distribution of cutoff scores using them. However, preferences are unobservable and making informational assumption about them is not easily justified.
Assumption 1 is justifiable in many centralized college admissions mechanisms 16 where past matching outcomes are public information and there is a strong correlation between the cutoff scores across years. 17 In these cases, publicly known cutoff scores are public signals for all students and matching outcomes from the past years play benchmark roles in the formation of expectation for the forthcoming matching outcomes.
15 Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2015) also consider similar framework and they note that outcomes of the mechanism can be described with cutoffs.
16 It includes the college admission mechanism in Turkey, where all realized matching outcome are publicly available and distributed to college candidates in the submission guidance booklet.
17 The correlation of cutoff scores of college admissions' outcomes in Turkey across years are presented in Appendix. The correlation of cutoff scores are found more that 90% in Ghana for postsecondary admissions Ajayi (2015) . In addition the estimated density of demeaned cutoff percentiles presented in figure 2 2.4 Students' optimal college ranking strategies in the continuum economy In this section, we characterize students' optimal college ranking strategies in the continuum economy by allowing individual heterogeneities. This characterization is a result of the large market setting where students primarily use public information of past years cutoff scores to generate assignment beliefs.
In the continuum economy, student i's ROL preparation strategy is a function of her personal valuations for colleges, exam score, past years' matching outcomes, and her idiosyn-
In this context, student i considers her expected utility of matching using her subjective assignment probabilities (assignment belief). We allow each student to generate distribution of cutoff scores according to their understanding of mechanism and past years' matching information (T −1 i.e. past year's cutoff score).
18 Consequently, students solve their maximization problems with the following strategy;
where Ω i,j (p i , σ; T ) is the assignment probability that takes student i's score and cutoff scores of matching. Assignment of students to colleges with cutoff score explained in equation 3.
which is student i's idiosyncratic characteristic, changes subjective assignment probabilities through her generated distribution of cutoff scores. This factor aims to incorporate nonequilibrium play strategies in the students' college ranking strategies.
This ranking framework provides valuable understanding of students' ranking and choice behavior. First, students are maximizing their expected utilities according to their valuations over colleges and their subjective assignment probabilities. Second, with some regularity conditions, we can understand more about students' ranking strategies and propose an empirical strategy. We provide one more assumption to impose a condition on subjective assignment probabilities of students such that the most important input for generating distribution of cutoff scores is coming from past year's cutoff scores.
Assumption 2 says that student i's subjective assignment probability for a college that has a higher cutoff score in the last realized matching is lower or equal than a college that has lower cutoff score in the last matching. These 2 assumptions in the large college admissions model allows us to present our theorem.
Theorem 1. For each student with a given exam scores, if there is a college that a student's subjective assignment probability is zero, then all colleges that have higher cutoff score in the previous year have zero subjective assignment probability.
Theorem 1 provides an environment to narrow down college options according to predicted ranking behavior. According to theorem 1, each student has a limit score that her subjective assignment probabilities are positive until that limit. Therefore, we can say that a student ranks colleges according to her true preference order in her achievable region to maximize her expected utility. This is the key prediction of our model and we build our empirical strategy on this finding. Finally, since there is a cost of adding a college in ROL, we assume that students have enough incentive to rank a college as long as their assignment probabilities are positive.
Assumption 3 says that the cost of including any colleges are not bigger than expected gain if there is a positive belief. Therefore, students may include all colleges that are considered to be accessible in their ROLs until the limited number, which is the observed students' behavior in our data. The majority of college applications report rank order lists strictly less than allowed number in Turkey. Therefore, in our empirical framework we produce estimation strategy accordingly.
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Empirical Framework
In this section, we first present challenges in students' preference estimation with a data from centralized college admissions that uses Deferred Acceptance with truncated lists. Then, we 20 If students have more colleges that they may want to include their list than limited number, they can only report a subset of colleges that they want to report. These cases creates another possibility for making mistaken comparison for estimating preferences.
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propose our estimation method based on personal choice sets, which is developed students' college ranking predictions from large college admissions model in section 2.
In DA with truncated lists, the main challenge is estimating preferences without making wrong comparisons of colleges in ROLs with colleges is not included in ROLs. Students may not include their preferred choices if their subjective assignment probabilities are too low even though these choices are more preferred compare to the listed colleges in their ROLs. This is the major concern for estimating students' college preferences with truth-telling assumption and there is no ideal solution to identify which colleges are not included because of strategic concerns.
21 In addition, finding the colleges that are not included because of strategic reasons is one of the objective of estimating preferences from reported ROLs.
Our empirical strategy is estimating students' college preferences using collections of colleges that are considered and found accessible to be matched by students. In this way, we do not mistakenly compare colleges that are eliminated because of strategic concerns and reach misleading conclusions. This strategy allows not only to use all listed colleges in ROLs, which is not utilized by the previous estimation methods, but also to generalize asymptotic stability based estimation methods of multinomial choice framework 22 to ordered response framework. 23 Therefore, we can utilize all information of students' reported ROLs and eliminate problems related with strategic choices.
Implementing our estimation strategy requires to use students' ranking behavior for constructing set of colleges that is considered and found accessible by students. These sets are named consideration sets. To fix ideas for consideration sets, let us consider student i with score p i . Student i considers that there is a score (P i ) such that all colleges that are lower expected cutoff scores than this score is accessible for her. In other words, her subjective assignment probabilities are bigger than 0 for all colleges that have expected cutoff score less thanP i and she finds all colleges that have higher expected score thanP i is not accessible for her.
24P
i depends on not only student i's score in the exam, but also her risk attitude, understanding of the matching mechanism, and other unobservable factors. Therefore, usinḡ P i we can define a consideration set, which is a collection of colleges that agents believe that there is sufficiently high assignment probability.
21 Expect some very strong preference assumptions (e.g., homogenous preferences) that has no reason to analyze, we can not make claim for students' true preference orders.
22 Fack et al. (2017) , Kirkebøen et al. (2012) , and Burgess et al. (2015) 23 Asymptotic stability based estimation methods develop estimation assuming that matched choice is the favorite choice among the feasible colleges.
24 The cost of including a college in the list is not zero. In addition to mental cost of calculating probabilities, students need to consider possible arrangements in the cases of assignment.
Adopting consideration sets for estimation enables us to deal with truth-telling and equilibrium-play assumptions, however, it is not direct to implement in empirical works because students' subjective assignment probabilities are not observable. By following our model in section 2, we generate a procedure to construct consideration sets using past year's matching information.
25 Since past years' matching outcomes are publicly available and play an important role for students' ranking behavior, combining this information produces a data-driven procedure for estimation.
Our construction of personal consideration sets procedure works as follow: Given that students use past year's cutoff scores as a primary source of information to prepare their ROLs, we can approximate their expected limit cutoff score from their reported ROLs and past year's cutoff scores. Since highest cutoff score according to last year's outcome in students'
reported ROLs is observed and it is assumed that students prepare their ROLs rationally, based on our model's prediction, we can claim that students find no higher expected cutoff score than reported highest expected cutoff score is accessible for them. In our notation,
is the last year's cutoff score of college j. Recall that L i denotes ROL of candidate i. The statement above says that there is no student that includes a college j in her ROL if expected cutoff is higher than her upper limit cutoff score. As a consequence, we can construct consideration sets using this relationship. Since our model and rationality assumption implies that we do not observe any college in ROL that does not satisfies the inequality, we can write that
Therefore, we construct consideration sets for each students with all colleges that are lower cutoff scores in the last matching than max{t
This construction is also compatible with expected utility maximization, an agent includes college j in her list if it is in her consideration set and the value of assignment is higher than outside option.
26 Under a positive cost (κ) for adding a college in the ROL, the colleges with have same utility with outside option and zero assignment beliefs are excluded from the ROLs. Since including an additional college decreases expected utility because of the cost, it is not rational to include in ROL.
A similar approach of creating personal choice sets is achieved through assuming asymptotic stability by Fack et al. (2017) and Akyol and Krishna (2017) . They develop discrete choice estimation framework by using feasible colleges that are created by ex-post cutoff scores. Apart from dependence of a (asymptotic) stability assumption, one disadvantage of their method is lack of using full information in ROLs in the estimation. Since estimation can be done only in feasible regions, colleges that are not in the feasible region cannot be incorporated to estimation, while they are in the reported ROLs. Constructed personalized choice sets, however, contain feasible regions, hence we can say that comparisons in our consideration sets are more general than feasible regions and incorporates full information from
ROLs.
Finally, a drawback of consideration set approach, even students' assignment beliefs are assumed to be known perfectly, is the impossibility of making an analysis with all colleges in the mechanism. Since personal consideration sets exclude some colleges in the estimation process in order not to reach wrong conclusions, full information is not benefited from researchers. Lacking of making complete comparisons across colleges is the cost that is paid for reaching reliable results and it is inevitable in this models.
Model Specification and Estimation
We assume that student i's utility from attending college j can be represented by the following random utility model:
is defined as the deterministic part of the utility. X i,j are student college specific attributes, e.g., interactions of students characteristics and college characteristics. d i,j is the distance from student i's city to college j's city. We normalize the effect of distance to be -1, so the magnitude of other coefficients can be easily interpreted in terms of willingness to travel. In addition, for location normalization, θ 1 = 0.
After construction of individual consideration sets (CR), students' college preference estimation from their rank order lists becomes a standard ranked order data analysis. In this setting, student i has right to rank K college but she does not have to fulfill the list. We do not restrict the number of options in individual consideration sets, however, they have to be bigger or equal than the number of colleges in the ROL i.e ∀ |CR i | ≥ |L i |, because of their constructions.
If each student ranks their options truthfully in their corresponding consideration sets and submits L i , then we can apply ordered choice model to our data. By following the literature (Hastings et al. (2009) , Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017) ), we consider a conditional choice probability structure in logistic distribution 27 form such that;
where j L i j indicates that j is not ranked before j in L i , which includes j itself and the colleges are not ranked in L i . This rank-ordered logit model can be seen as a series of conditional logit models: one for top-ranked college-major (l 1 i ) being the most preferred; another for the second-ranked college-major (l 2 i ) being preferred to all college-major except the one ranked first, and so on.
The model is point identified under standard assumptions for rank-order choice models and can be estimated by maximum likelihood estimation with the log-likelihood function:
Application: College Admissions in Turkey
There is a centralized college admissions system in Turkey. Students who wish to pursue higher education take a nationwide college entrance exam (CEE), which is conducted by the Student Selection and Placement Center (CSSP). The sum of students' college entrance exam scores and scaled and weighted high school GPAs determines students' priorities in admissions. After the announcement of the exam score and scaled GPA, a student, who wants to continue student-college matching stage, submits a ROL of up to 24 college-majors to the CSSP.
28 CSSP matches students and colleges using the student proposing Gale-Shapley 
Data
For the empirical analysis, we use three data sets. The first data set is obtained from CSSP. It provides students college entrance exam scores, GPAs, and their ROLs if they have submitted. The second data set is a survey study which is conducted in 2005. 32 The survey sample is randomly selected from senior high school students who would take the CEE in 2005. This survey includes questions about socioeconomic, politic, demographic and educational background. The last data set is a list of cutoff scores for college-majors across years and publicly available on the CSSP website.
There are 12829 senior high school students participants in the survey study, but almost half of them do not submit rank ordered lists after the exam. Students do not submit a list 29 Balinski and Sönmez (1999) show that the outcome is college proposing DA even though candidates submit ROLs if there is no truncation in ROLs.
30 Detailed information for Turkish high school institutional structure can be found in Akyol and Krishna (2017) . 31 The total score calculated as follows: T otalscore i = CEE i + 0.8 × shsGP A i if the choice in the same track, T otalscore i = CEE i + 0.3 × shsGP A i otherwise.
32 For detailed information and descriptive analysis see Alkan et al. (2008) . either they find their score lower than their expectations and prefer to wait a year to try again or they prefer not to pursue college education after they learn their score. Since we are interested in students' college preferences, we exclude students who do not submit ROL. Table 1 reports students' characteristics, choices, and outcomes' statistics. 45 percent of the sample do not submit a ROL after they learn their priorities. The average number of choices in ROL is close to 7. After the matching, 44 percent of the sample is assigned to a college and 12 percent of the sample is assigned to their first choices. Table 1 also reports summary statistics students' parent education levels, living areas, and income levels. Table 2 presents summary statistics of college-majors. There are almost half of the collegemajors offer two-year degree to their students. Even though admissions of these college majors are through the same mechanism, there are many specific rules that apply graduates from different high schools. We exclude these college-majors from our students' college preferences 
Estimation Results
In Table 3 , we present estimation results based on three identifying assumptions. The first column presents estimates students' college preference estimates where students are assumed to rank truthfully. Under truthful-revelation reported list assumption, we treat listed colleges as the students' most preferred choices. Second column presents estimates with the stability assumption and the third column is for our proposed method; consideration sets approach.
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In order to make consistent comparisons between estimates, we reduce our sample to students who are assigned after matching, only report 4 year degree majors, and do not use all spots in the ROLs. These restrictions reduce our sample to 2863. The results show clear differences between three different estimations which are based on different assumptions. The difference between truthful-ranking with the other two estimates specifically observed from the college fixed effect estimates. Many elite colleges that are highly selected from students with high priority have smaller or negative fixed effects with the truth-telling assumption.
For example, the coefficients for Bogazici University is smaller than many other universities' fixed effects under truth-telling assumption. However, students with highest scores in college entrance exam are listed it frequently.
34 Many students who does not have high priorities do not include it in their ROLs, which leads to a low estimates of its fixed effect under truth-telling assumption.
Another interesting results is the effects of universities capacities on the universities fixed 33 In Fack et al. (2017) , similar preference estimation with endogenous school cutoff scores are also considered in the school choice context in Paris, but there is no significant difference is founded. By comparing the size of the matching games, there are 1.8 millions of students are in college admissions in Turkey, it is expected to reach similar conclusion.
34 Bogazici is the one of the most popular colleges among students who has the highest priorities. In Appendix, we prepare a chart for first 100 students' first college choices in each education track. The estimation based on stability assumption is a modification of the proposed method by Fack et al. (2017) according to our data. We construct feasible colleges according to cutoff scores which are result of the year 2004 matching. 35 We apply ordered data methods to obtain estimates from constructed feasible sets and reordered feasible ranks.
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As we explained in our estimation strategy, we construct consideration sets of students by using 2004 matching cutoff which is public information. These cutoff scores lead us to observe each students' range of college according to cutoff scores when they are preparing their ROLs.
The advantage of this setting is its dependence of beliefs generated from public information rather than equilibrium assignment probabilities which may be harder to satisfied in large choice sets. In addition, we can include all ranked colleges into estimation without separating them as feasible or not. Since each college in the ROL includes information about students' college preferences, disregarding this information decreases the power of the estimates.
The difference between estimates based on stability and personal consideration sets approach can be also easily seen from the estimated coefficients and college fixed effects. Especially, the estimated coefficients for college in private college coefficient is different from each other substantially. Even though these differences are suggestive for the differences in estimates as the result of identifying assumptions, we need statistical tests to reach conclusive results.
Testing stability against personal consideration sets approach
Under two different identifying assumptions, we have two distinct estimates for the parameters for students' college preferences. This setting provides an opportunity to test stability assumption against to personalized consideration sets by adopting a Hausman-Type specification test.
We know that if every student play equilibrium strategies, the matching outcome is stable. However, if students play non-equilibrium strategies, the matching outcome do not have to be stable. Therefore, personalized consideration set approach is less restrictive than stability assumption because it does not require equilibrium outcome. Consequently, under null hypothesis that students play equilibrium strategies and outcome is stable, bothΘ P andΘ S are consistent but onlyΘ S is asymptotically efficient. Under the alternative, when students do not play equilibrium strategies, the outcome is not stable but they ranked colleges from their personalized consideration sets. Then, onlyΘ P is consistent.
In this setting, we can offer a general specification test developed by Hausman (1978) such that
where (V P −V S ) −1 is the inverse of the difference between the asymptotic covariance matrices ofΘ S andΘ P .
The test rejects stability in the favor of personalized consideration sets (p-value < 0.01).
The tests based on truth-telling against to both stability and personalized consideration sets are also rejected strongly. In the following section of this paper, we focus on the results obtained with personalized consideration sets assumption.
Welfare Analysis
In this section, we use our preferred preference estimates to evaluate the effects of different admission criteria on students' welfare. Admission criteria determine students' priorities in the matching, consequently they affect not only students' matching outcomes but also students' ranking strategies in the truncated ROL mechanisms. Therefore, comparing different admission criteria is an important step in the evaluation of centralized college admission mechanisms. We study the effects of two admission criteria which are the two separate scores of the college admission criteria that form the current priority rule:
1. College exam score. College exam score is the only determinant of priority indices.
A similar admission criterion is also used in the high school admission mechanism in Turkey, Akyol and Krishna (2017) .
2. High School GPA. Priority indices are based on scaled high school GPAs.
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The applied admission criterion in our data is a weighted sum of scores form national level exam and scaled high school GPA. The implementation of this admission rule can be considered a unique rule except small cases. 37 We are interested in these two criteria because of differences of their formation periods. High school GPA is the average of many courses that is taken across 3 or 4 years depends on the high school. However, college entrance exam is only one time exam and the scores are subject to include exam day shocks compare with the scaled GPAs. Comparison of these two version of measurements shed lights on heterogeneity among college applicants' matching outcomes as well as their utilities. Therefore, a policy maker may use these welfare analysis to design admission rules to create equitable college admissions.
Since we are working with a sample, simulating matching outcomes are not possible with the estimated college rankings and counterfactual admission rules. Instead, we use cutoff scores of colleges to determine assignments with different admission criteria. We show that in large matching mechanisms, outcomes can be represented with cutoff scores due to Azevedo and Leshno (2016) . Therefore, welfare analysis with different admission criteria by using same cutoff scores is reasonable way of creating counterfactual outcomes without full matching data. However, this can be thought as a partial equilibrium analysis since the change in submission strategies and their effects on matching outcomes cannot be evaluated under this method. Table 4 shows welfare changes between their original matches with their counterfactual matches with if only scaled high school GPAs is used for admissions. Since applied admission policy is a weighted sum of two admission criteria that we are interested, comparing results with original criteria and scaled high school GPAs also provide information about matching with only exam scores.
We present welfare changes for different groups of students in 4 categories i.e., gender, age, income categories, and high school types. Even though results are changing in between groups and students, there is a common pattern in the welfare of students if they are matched according to their scaled high school GPAs if everything else keeps constant. This pattern is a result of the difference of score distributions between national level exam and high school GPA.
According to the Table 4 , Panel 1, female students gain less if the admission criteria only depends scaled high school compare with males. In panel 2, we observe the opposite 
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case for the younger college applicants. Their welfare gains from only high school GPA based admission criteria is lower than older applicants. The welfare effects are also changing among different income levels. According to Panel 3, the main welfare gains are low income groups.
However, the welfare changes are not monotonically decreasing with income levels.
Panel 4 presents the welfare effects of changing admission rules across to high school types. High schools in Turkey differentiated in terms of curriculum and student selection mechanisms.
38 At the end of the middle school, students who are willing to continue their education in selective high school have to take national level exam and students and school are matched according the exam score and students' high school rankings. We indicate selective high schools with (S) in the table 4. Results in Panel 4 show that there are differences in terms of welfare effects among high schools. Students from regional and private high schools are benefited the most switch from current criterion to scaled high school GPA criterion.
For students from selective vocational high schools have the effects are small even opposite for teacher vocational high school. These results suggest that admission criteria and high school grading policies as well as curriculum should be taken into account for equitable college admissions.
The results suggest that using different performance measure for admission criterion has differentiated effects on various income categories, for different high school student and between male and female, as well as age groups. Therefore, policymakers may use these changes as an additional tool in their hands in order to affect distribution of matching outcomes across different groups apart from affirmative action type admission criteria.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a novel, practical, and data-driven method to estimate students' college preferences from truncated rank order lists in college admissions data under the popular Deferred Acceptance mechanism. This mechanism is applied in many school and college admissions systems around the world and our method can be readily applied in any of these cases. Our method uses public information from matching outcomes in order to control strategic behaviors in students' college rankings. Since it is a data-driven approach, it is more robust than theory-based estimation approaches depend on equilibrium conditions. Moreover, this method provides a framework to utilize all information form rank order lists, 38 For more detailed information admission mechanisms of high schools in Turkey Akyol and Krishna (2017) 27 which is not possible for previous methods.
We apply our method to data that is obtained from college admission in Turkey. In order to compare our estimation strategy with the methods proposed in the literature, we test our results in different identifying assumptions; truth-telling and stability. Our tests strongly reject truth-telling and stability hypotheses.
Finally, we use our preferred estimates in the welfare analysis to understand the effects of different admission criteria. The results show that winners differentiate according to admission criteria and students' characteristics. Consequently, policy makers should consider the effects of performance measures in the determination of admission criterion for school and college admissions.
A further structural analysis of the college admissions data to estimate students' college preferences from rank order lists taking endogenous score formation into account would be a natural direction of future research. This extension would allow us to benefit from their college admission preparation strategies to improve estimation methods for students' college preference estimations rather than depending on only truncated rank order lists. This is also important in policy design perspective such that estimation results provide the relationship between college admissions preparation and college choice. Thus, a policymaker can design admission policies using preference information rather than only restricting itself with admissions criteria as the only policy tool. 8 Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1
We want to show first for a given student i with score p i , j ] ≥ 0 because it is probability and cannot be less than 0. Then; 
